Orakel Classics
The Federalist Papers
The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, prepared as a public-domain Orakel edition with 85 chapter-aware companion links.
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Federalist No. I: General Introduction
Federalist No. I: General Introduction from The Federalist Papers. After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting
Open2Federalist No. II: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
Federalist No. II: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence from The Federalist Papers. When the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be
Open3Federalist No. III: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. III: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. It is not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united
Open4Federalist No. IV: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. IV: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. My last paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the State governments or the proposed little
Open5Federalist No. V: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. V: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. Queen Anne, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: “An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities
Open6Federalist No. VI: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
Federalist No. VI: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States from The Federalist Papers. The three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming kind—those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions.
Open7Federalist No. VII: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. VII: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. It is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say—precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our
Open8Federalist No. VIII: The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
Federalist No. VIII: The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States from The Federalist Papers. Assuming it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail
Open9Federalist No. IX: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
Federalist No. IX: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. IX: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and
Open10Federalist No. X: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. X: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. Among the numerous advantages promised by a wellconstructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without
Open11Federalist No. XI: The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
Federalist No. XI: The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XI: The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a
Open12Federalist No. XII: The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
Federalist No. XII: The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue from The Federalist Papers. The effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present
Open13Federalist No. XIII: Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
Federalist No. XIII: Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government from The Federalist Papers. As connected with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different
Open14Federalist No. XIV: Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory
Federalist No. XIV: Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XIV: Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of
Open15Federalist No. XV: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
Federalist No. XV: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XV: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
Open16Federalist No. XVI: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XVI: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. The tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities, in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and
Open17Federalist No. XVII: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XVII: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. An objection, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local
Open18Federalist No. XVIII: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XVIII: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. Among the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American
Open19Federalist No. XIX: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XIX: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. The examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic
Open20Federalist No. XX: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XX: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. The United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the lessons derived from those which we have already
Open21Federalist No. XXI: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
Federalist No. XXI: Other Defects of the Present Confederation from The Federalist Papers. Having in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely
Open22Federalist No. XXII: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XXII: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. In addition to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the
Open23Federalist No. XXIII: The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the
Federalist No. XXIII: The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XXIII: The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to
Open24Federalist No. XXIV: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
Federalist No. XXIV: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XXIV: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further
Open25Federalist No. XXV: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XXV: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. It may perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of the primary principle of our political association, as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous
Open26Federalist No. XXVI: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Federalist No. XXVI: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XXVI: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to
Open27Federalist No. XXVII: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XXVII: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense
Open28Federalist No. XXVIII: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XXVIII: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense
Open29Federalist No. XXIX: Concerning the Militia
Federalist No. XXIX: Concerning the Militia from The Federalist Papers. The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the
Open30Federalist No. XXX: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
Federalist No. XXX: Concerning the General Power of Taxation from The Federalist Papers. It has been already observed that the federal government ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in
Open31Federalist No. XXXI: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XXXI: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. In disquisitions of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong interest,
Open32Federalist No. XXXII: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XXXII: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. Although I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State governments from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money, because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State governments, and a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations for local purposes,
Open33Federalist No. XXXIII: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XXXIII: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. The residue of the argument against the provisions of the Constitution in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following clause. The last clause of the eighth section of the first article of the plan under consideration authorizes the national legislature “to make all laws which shall be NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying into execution THE POWERS by that Constitution vested in the government of the United
Open34Federalist No. XXXIV: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XXXIV: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. I flatter myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have COEQUAL authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be no color for the assertion that they would not possess means as abundant as could be
Open35Federalist No. XXXV: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XXXV: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. Before we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the national government, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public burdens to fall upon those objects. Two evils would spring from this source: the oppression
Open36Federalist No. XXXVI: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. XXXVI: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. We have seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned professions, who will truly
Open37Federalist No. XXXVII: Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form
Federalist No. XXXVII: Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XXXVII: Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper
Open38Federalist No. XXXVIII: The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to
Federalist No. XXXVIII: The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XXXVIII: The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections
Open39Federalist No. XXXIX: The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
Federalist No. XXXIX: The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles from The Federalist Papers. The last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our
Open40Federalist No. XL: The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and
Federalist No. XL: The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XL: The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined
Open41Federalist No. XLI: General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
Federalist No. XLI: General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution from The Federalist Papers. The Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of this power among its several branches. Under the FIRST view of the subject, two important questions arise:
Open42Federalist No. XLII: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
Federalist No. XLII: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered from The Federalist Papers. The second class of powers, lodged in the general government, consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit: to make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; to regulate foreign commerce, including a power to prohibit, after the year
Open43Federalist No. XLIII: The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution
Federalist No. XLIII: The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XLIII: The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the
Open44Federalist No. XLIV: Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
Federalist No. XLIV: Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States from The Federalist Papers. A fifth class of provisions in favor of the federal authority consists of the following restrictions on the authority of the several States:1. “No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex-post-facto law, or law impairing
Open45Federalist No. XLV: The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State
Federalist No. XLV: The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State from The Federalist Papers. Having shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States. The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the federal
Open46Federalist No. XLVI: The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
Federalist No. XLVI: The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared from The Federalist Papers. Resuming the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United
Open47Federalist No. XLVII: The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of
Federalist No. XLVII: The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XLVII: The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution
Open48Federalist No. XLVIII: These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No
Federalist No. XLVIII: These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XLVIII: These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have
Open49Federalist No. XLIX: Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of
Federalist No. XLIX: Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. XLIX: Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department
Open50Federalist No. L: Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
Federalist No. L: Periodical Appeals to the People Considered from The Federalist Papers. It may be contended, perhaps, that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them, PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. It will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for ENFORCING the Constitution, by keeping the several
Open51Federalist No. LI: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and
Federalist No. LI: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. LI: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks
Open52Federalist No. LII: The House of Representatives
Federalist No. LII: The House of Representatives from The Federalist Papers. From the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives. The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the
Open53Federalist No. LIII: The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)
Federalist No. LIII: The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) from The Federalist Papers. I shall here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, “that where annual elections end, tyranny begins. “ If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the
Open54Federalist No. LIV: The Apportionment of Members Among the States
Federalist No. LIV: The Apportionment of Members Among the States from The Federalist Papers. The next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the appointment of its members to the several States which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes. It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each State. The establishment of the same rule for the
Open55Federalist No. LV: The Total Number of the House of Representatives
Federalist No. LV: The Total Number of the House of Representatives from The Federalist Papers. The number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another and a very interesting point of view, under which this branch of the federal legislature may be
Open56Federalist No. LVI: The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of
Federalist No. LVI: The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of from The Federalist Papers. The second charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents. As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests, without taking into view at the same time the
Open57Federalist No. LVII: The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense
Federalist No. LVII: The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. LVII: The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the
Open58Federalist No. LVIII: Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the
Federalist No. LVIII: Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. LVIII: Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as
Open59Federalist No. LIX: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
Federalist No. LIX: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. LIX: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of
Open60Federalist No. LX: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. LX: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. We have seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended, that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the
Open61Federalist No. LXI: The Same Subject Continued
Federalist No. LXI: The Same Subject Continued from The Federalist Papers. The more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections, contained in the plan of the convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of
Open62Federalist No. LXII: The Senate
Federalist No. LXII: The Senate from The Federalist Papers. Having examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the
Open63Federalist No. LXIII: The Senate Continued
Federalist No. LXIII: The Senate Continued from The Federalist Papers. A fifth desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not
Open64Federalist No. LXIV: The Powers of the Senate
Federalist No. LXIV: The Powers of the Senate from The Federalist Papers. It is a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution in the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in
Open65Federalist No. LXV: The Powers of the Senate Continued
Federalist No. LXV: The Powers of the Senate Continued from The Federalist Papers. The remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination
Open66Federalist No. LXVI: Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for
Federalist No. LXVI: Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for from The Federalist Papers. A review of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions which may still exist in regard to this
Open67Federalist No. LXVII: The Executive Department
Federalist No. LXVII: The Executive Department from The Federalist Papers. The constitution of the executive department of the proposed government, claims next our
Open68Federalist No. LXVIII: The Mode of Electing the President
Federalist No. LXVIII: The Mode of Electing the President from The Federalist Papers. The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded.[1] I venture somewhat further,
Open69Federalist No. LXIX: The Real Character of the Executive
Federalist No. LXIX: The Real Character of the Executive from The Federalist Papers. I proceed now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the convention. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in regard to
Open70Federalist No. LXX: The Executive Department Further Considered
Federalist No. LXX: The Executive Department Further Considered from The Federalist Papers. There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading
Open71Federalist No. LXXI: The Duration in Office of the Executive
Federalist No. LXXI: The Duration in Office of the Executive from The Federalist Papers. Duration in office has been mentioned as the second requisite to the energy of the Executive authority. This has relation to two objects: to the personal firmness of the executive magistrate, in the employment of his constitutional powers; and to the stability of the system of administration which may have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to the first, it must be evident, that the longer the duration in
Open72Federalist No. LXXII: The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive
Federalist No. LXXII: The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. LXXII: The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the
Open73Federalist No. LXXIII: The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
Federalist No. LXXIII: The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. LXXIII: The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto
Open74Federalist No. LXXIV: The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power
Federalist No. LXXIV: The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. LXXIV: The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning
Open75Federalist No. LXXV: The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
Federalist No. LXXV: The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive from The Federalist Papers. The President is to have power, “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present
Open76Federalist No. LXXVI: The Appointing Power of the Executive
Federalist No. LXXVI: The Appointing Power of the Executive from The Federalist Papers. The President is “to NOMINATE, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, or in
Open77Federalist No. LXXVII: The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive
Federalist No. LXXVII: The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. LXXVII: The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the
Open78Federalist No. LXXVIII: The Judiciary Department
Federalist No. LXXVIII: The Judiciary Department from The Federalist Papers. We proceed now to an examination of the judiciary department of the proposed
Open79Federalist No. LXXIX: The Judiciary Continued
Federalist No. LXXIX: The Judiciary Continued from The Federalist Papers. Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. The remark made in relation to the President is equally applicable here. In the general course of human nature, A POWER OVER A MAN’s SUBSISTENCE AMOUNTS TO A POWER OVER HIS WILL. And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the complete separation of the judicial from the
Open80Federalist No. LXXX: The Powers of the Judiciary
Federalist No. LXXX: The Powers of the Judiciary from The Federalist Papers. To judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal judicature, it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are its proper
Open81Federalist No. LXXXI: The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
Federalist No. LXXXI: The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. LXXXI: The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial
Open82Federalist No. LXXXII: The Judiciary Continued
Federalist No. LXXXII: The Judiciary Continued from The Federalist Papers. The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties. ’T is time only that can mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the
Open83Federalist No. LXXXIII: The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
Federalist No. LXXXIII: The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury from The Federalist Papers. The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this State, and perhaps in several of the other States, is THAT RELATIVE TO THE WANT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION for the trial by jury in civil cases. The disingenuous form in which this objection is usually stated has been repeatedly adverted to and exposed, but continues to be pursued in all the conversations and writings of the
Open84Federalist No. LXXXIV: Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution
Federalist No. LXXXIV: Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution from The Federalist Papers. Federalist No. LXXXIV: Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the
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Federalist No. LXXXV: Concluding Remarks from The Federalist Papers. According to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points: “the analogy of the proposed government to your own State constitution,” and “the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property.” But these heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted in the
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